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Abstract
We consider an e±ciency-wage model with the Calvo-type sticky prices and ana-
lyze the optimal monetary policy when the unemployment insurance is not perfect.
With imperfect risk sharing, the strict zero-in°ation policy is no longer optimal even
when the steady-state equilibrium is made (conditionally) e±cient. Quantitative re-
sults depend on how the idiosyncratic earnings loss due to unemployment varies over
business cycles. If the idiosyncratic income loss is acyclical, the optimal policy di®ers
very little from the zero-in°ation policy. However, if it varies countercyclically, as
evidence suggests, the deviation of the optimal policy from the complete price-level
stabilization becomes quantitatively signi¯cant. Furthermore, the optimal policy in
such a case involves stabilization of output to a much larger extent.
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RIETI Discussion Paper Series 09-E-0141 Introduction
There is a growing amount of literature on optimal monetary policy based on the dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium framework with imperfect competition and staggered price
setting. Its simplest version has two types of distortions: relative-price distortions due
to staggered price setting, and distortions associated with imperfect competition (market
power). As discussed by Goodfriend and King (1997), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
and Woodford (2003), if ¯scal policy is used to o®set the distortions caused by market
power, then the optimal monetary policy is characterized by complete stabilization of the
price level. The intuition is very simple: without distortions due to market power, the
°exible-price equilibrium becomes e±cient, which in turn can be attained by the zero-
in°ation policy.1 It is the price level that has to be stabilized, but not the level of output.2
As long as the in°ation rate is kept at zero, any °uctuations in output would be e±cient.
The basic model has been extended in several directions. For instance, Benigno and
Woodford (2003, 2005) and Khan, King and Wolman (2003) consider the case where
distortions due to market power are present. Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2005) extend the
analysis further by studying an even richer model based on Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (2005). The existing research on this literature, however, has restricted attention
to complete-markets (representative-agent) models. In this paper we are interested to see
the extent to which the nature of optimal monetary policy is a®ected by the presence of
unemployment when unemployment insurance is not perfect. In particular, we'd like to
examine whether or not the existence of imperfectly insured unemployed workers calls for
more output stabilization.
For this purpose, we bring unemployment into the basic sticky-price model by building
on the e±ciency-wage model of Alexopoulos (2004). The model has a representative
household with a continuum of individual members. In each period, each member is either
employed or unemployed. An employed worker may or may not shirk. A detected shirker
will be punished by an exogenous reduction in the wage payment.3 Firms determine the
wage rate so that no workers would shirk in equilibrium. An important assumption that
makes the model tractable is that individuals members of a household are not allowed to
participate in the asset market; it is the household that makes all the decisions related
to savings. Due to this assumption, we are able to use the representative-household
1Note that this argument assumes that initial price dispersion is nil (or \small" if we are interested in
a ¯rst-order approximation of optimal monetary policy). See Yun (2005) on this point.
2What is stabilized is the \output gap," which is de¯ned as the di®erence between the actual level of
output and the e±cient level of output.
3A relation with the model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) is discussed in the Appendix.
2framework even though the unemployment insurance is not perfect. The rest of the model
is similar to the basic sticky-price model of Woodford (2003).
We analyze optimal monetary policy using the linear-quadratic approach developed by
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Woodford (2003), and Benigno and Woodford (2003,
2005). To focus on the e®ect of imperfect unemployment insurance on stabilization pol-
icy, we mostly assume that ¯scal policy is used to make the zero-in°ation steady state
conditionally e±cient. It follows that with perfect insurance the °exible-price equilibrium
is e±cient so that the complete price-level stabilization is the optimal policy. This is not
true with imperfect insurance, where the optimal policy would involve some °uctuations
in the in°ation rate. Our qualitative analysis shows that a government-purchase shock is
a negative cost-push shock, while a productivity shock is a positive one. That is, optimal
policy should generate some de°ation (in°ation) when there is an exogenous increase in
government purchases (productivity).
But, quantitatively, how large is the deviation of the optimal policy from the com-
plete price-level stabilization? The answer crucially depends on how idiosyncratic income
shocks vary over business cycles. Speci¯cally, what matters is how the relative income
of the unemployed to that of the employed varies over business cycles. We say that id-
iosyncratic income losses are acyclical if the relative income of the unemployed is constant
over business cycles, and countercyclical if the relative income varies procyclically. We
begin with the case where the relative income of the unemployed is constant over business
cycles. In this case, although the complete price-level stabilization is not exactly optimal
with imperfect insurance, the optimal policy di®ers very little from it. Thus, as long as
idiosyncratic income losses are acyclical, the optimal policy essentially takes the form of
the complete price-level stabilization. This is so even though the unemployment rate goes
up in a recession.
Evidence seems to suggest, however, that idiosyncratic shocks are countercyclical. In
particular, earnings losses of unemployed or displaced workers are found to be counter-
cyclical (e.g., Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan, 1993). To take it into account, our second
numerical exercise assumes that the relative income of the unemployed varies procycli-
cally over business cycles. In this case, the deviation of the optimal policy from the
zero-in°ation policy becomes much larger. Furthermore, the optimal policy under coun-
tercyclical idiosyncratic income losses involves stabilization of the level of output, much
more so compared to the case where idiosyncratic income losses are acyclical. The intu-
ition is simple: if a bad shock to the economy worsens uninsured idiosyncratic shocks and
makes the unemployed more miserable, policy should respond by reducing unemployment
3through increasing the level of output.
Our numerical exercise suggests that the mere existence of imperfectly insured unem-
ployed workers may not justify output stabilization; there needs to be systematic variation
in the idiosyncratic risk over business cycles. An important limitation of our model is that
idiosyncratic shocks are purely transitory. Evidence such as Storesletten, Telmer and
Yaron (2004) suggests, however, that idiosyncratic shocks are highly persistent as well as
countercyclical. Based on a non-monetary growth model, Krebs (2007) demonstrates that
the welfare cost of business cycles can be sizable with such idiosyncratic shocks. Analyzing
optimal policy with persistent idiosyncratic shocks is left for future research.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model economy is described. In
Section 3 the e±cient allocation and the °exible-price equilibrium are discussed. In Section
4 a linear-quadratic approximation of the model is derived. In Section 5 optimal monetary
policy is examined in the case where the degree of risk sharing is constant over business
cycles. Section 6 considers the case where the degree of risk sharing °uctuates cyclically.
There, we also extend our analysis to the case where the non-stochastic steady state is
ine±cient. Concluding remarks are in Section 7.
2 The model economy
In this section we describe our model economy. Its key features are staggered price set-
ting and unemployment. Our model builds on Woodford (2003) for the former and the
e±ciency-wage model of Alexopoulos (2004) for the latter. Alexopoulos's model di®ers
from the well-known model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) in that a detected shirker is
punished by a reduction in the wage rate, rather than by getting ¯red. Nevertheless, as
discussed in the Appendix, it becomes observationally equivalent to the Shapiro-Stiglitz
model with a particular unemployment insurance program. Indeed, we ¯nd it very con-
venient that Alexopoulos's model can be made observationally equivalent to the standard
indivisible-labor model of Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), or to the Shapiro-Stiglitz
model, depending on the assumed unemployment insurance program.
2.1 Households
There is a representative household which has a continuum of individual members of unit
measure. In each period, randomly selected Nt individuals receive job o®ers. The rest,
41 ¡ Nt, are unemployed.4 All employed workers work for a ¯xed length of hours, h. An
employed worker, however, may or may not shirk. A shirker is a worker whose e®ort level
is di®erent from that required by her employer, et.5
The utility °ow of an employed individual who consumes C and exerts an e®ort level
e is given by
U(C;e) = lnC + ! ln(H ¡ he); (1)
where !;H > 0 are constant parameters, and C is the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of di®eren-










Given the prices of di®erentiated products, p(i), i 2 [0;1], the standard cost-minimization














; i 2 [0;1]:
The utility °ow of an unemployed individual is given by U(C;0).
An important assumption we make for tractability is that individual members of a
household are not allowed to participate in the asset market (they cannot save or borrow
individually). Instead, it is the household that participates in the asset market, where
it trades Arrow securities for aggregate shocks with the government.6 In addition, the
household receives (nominal) dividends from the ¯rms, ¦t(i), i 2 [0;1]; and pays (nominal)
lump-sum taxes to the government, Tt. The °ow budget constraint of the household is
then given by
It + Et[Qt;t+1At+1] = At +
Z 1
0
¦t(i)di ¡ Tt; (2)
4We assume that whether or not each individual receives a job o®er is observable and that a person
who turns down a job o®er loses eligibility for unemployment bene¯ts. Then as long as the unemployment-
insurance fee is not too large, no one would turn down a job o®er.
5As we shall see, the required level of e®ort will be the same for all ¯rms.
6Note that, although there is only partial insurance against the idiosyncratic risk of becoming unem-
ployed, there is a complete asset market for aggregate shocks.
5where It is the \income" distributed equally across the household members, At+1 denotes
the trading in Arrow securities and Qt;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor used to evaluate










Here, Qt;t+j is the stochastic discount factor used to evaluate date-t + j nominal income
at date t, which is de¯ned recursively as
Qt;t+j = Qt;t+j¡1Qt+j¡1;t+j; j ¸ 1;
with Qt;t ´ 1.
With lump-sum transfer It from the household, the date-t consumption of an employed
individual who is not detected shirking, Ce;t, is given by
PtCe;t = It + hWt ¡ UI
f
t ; (4)
where Wt is the nominal wage rate, and UI
f
t is the unemployment-insurance fee. A shirker
is caught with probability d 2 (0;1). A detected shirker receives only a fraction s 2 [0;1)
of the wage. Both s and d are constant, exogenous parameters. The date-t consumption
of a detected shirker, Cs;t, becomes
PtCs;t = It + shWt ¡ UI
f
t : (5)
Given this, a shirker would always choose e = 0. Finally, the level of consumption of an
unemployed individual is given as
PtCu;t = It + UIb
t; (6)
where UIb
t denotes unemployment bene¯ts.7
The objective of the household is to maximize the average utility of its members. As we
shall see, ¯rms set the wage rate, Wt, and the required level of e®ort, et, so that employed






NtU(Ce;t;et) + (1 ¡ Nt)U(Cu;t;0)
i
(7)
7Our assumption that It is distributed equally between employed and unemployed members of the
household may be justi¯ed by imposing the information restriction that individuals cannot communicate
with the household after their employment status is known. I thank a referee for this interpretation.
6Taking as given A0 and fNt;et;Pt;Qt;t+1;Tt;UI
f
t ;UIb
t;Wt;¦t(i);i 2 [0;1];t ¸ 0g, the
household chooses fIt;At+1;t ¸ 0g so as to maximize the average utility (7) subject to
(2), (3), (4), (6).





Nt+1UC(Ce;t+1;et+1) + (1 ¡ Nt+1)UC(Cu;t+1;0)
NtUC(Ce;t;et) + (1 ¡ Nt)UC(Cu;t;0)
Notice that the marginal rate of substitution involves the average marginal utilities. The





2.2.1 No shirking condition














where Á ¸ 1, At is the economy-wide productivity shock, et is the level of e®ort required
by the ¯rm, nt and ns
t are the numbers of employed and of shirkers, respectively. Given
this production technology, having shirkers would never be pro¯table for ¯rms. Each
¯rm o®ers an employment contract, fet;Wtg, to its employed. As the following argument
shows, all ¯rms o®er the same contract, so that the index of ¯rms, i, is omitted here.
Because a shirker is detected with probability d, no workers in a given ¯rm would shirk
if
U(Ce;t;et) ¸ (1 ¡ d)U(Ce;t;0) + dU(Cs;t;0):
Given that Ce;t and Cs;t are determined as in (4) and (5), the incentive-compatible level
of e®ort must satisfy







shWt + It ¡ UI
f
t






where the ¯rm takes It, UI
f
t as given.
7The cost-minimization problem of the ¯rm is then given by
min
Wt;nt
Wtnt s.t. Atf(ethnt) ¸ yt; and et · e(Wt): (8)










where e and 0 < Âw < 1 are constants de¯ned in Appendix. As we shall discuss below,
the equilibrium wage rate in (9) is ine±cient unless unemployment insurance is perfect.
2.2.2 Calvo pricing






















= (1 ¡ ¿)pt(i)yt(i) ¡ hnt(i)Wt



















Following Calvo (1983), we assume that only a fraction (1 ¡ ®) of randomly selected
¯rms can reset their prices in each period. The rest of the ¯rms simply charge the same
prices as in the previous period. Thus, if ¯rm i receives the opportunity of resetting its








8In this model, all ¯rms that reset prices in the same period choose the same price.8 Let
p¤















where st;T is the real marginal cost in period T of those ¯rms that reset their prices in
period t, and





The government conducts monetary and ¯scal policy. The °ow budget constraint for the
government is
Tt + ¿PtYt + NtUI
f
t + Et[Qt;t+1At+1] = At + PtGt + (1 ¡ Nt)UIb
t;
where At+1 denotes the state-contingent debt issued by the government and A0 is given.




t, Gt, as well as Pt, Nt, and Yt. Fiscal policy sets Tt in the \Ricardian" way
(Woodford, 1995) so that we do not need to specify the details of the conduct of ¯scal
policy. Monetary policy is formulated as in Woodford (2003, Chapter 7), Benigno and
Woodford (2003, 2005), among others. Thus, optimal monetary policy is implicitly de¯ned
as the solution to the (adequately modi¯ed version of) Ramsey problem. With a linear-
quadratic approximation, in particular, monetary policy is to set a state-contingent path
of in°ation rates.
2.4 Exogenous variables
The unemployment-insurance fee, UI
f
t , is assumed to remain small enough so that no
worker with a job o®er would turn it down. Speci¯cally, given that U(Ce;e) = U(Cs;0) in
equilibrium and that a worker who turns down a job o®er is not eligible for unemployment




8An implicit assumption here is that each ¯rm possesses the same, constant amount of ¯rm-speci¯c
capital. If we allow for accumulation of such capital, the price chosen by a ¯rm would depend on the
amount of capital it holds. See Woodford (2005) for such a model.
9which is assumed to hold throughout this paper.












If unemployment insurance is perfect, Bt = 1; otherwise, Bt < 1. Let Ct be the aggregate
level of consumption:
Ct ´ NtCe;t + (1 ¡ Nt)Cu;t:
The goods-market equilibrium condition is given by
Yt = Ct + Gt; (14)
where Gt is government purchases. The levels of consumption of the employed and the
unemployed are expressed respectively as
Ce;t =
1




Nt + (1 ¡ Nt)Bt
Ct: (16)
The unemployment insurance program is run with balanced budget: NtUI
f
t = (1 ¡
Nt)UIb
t. Note that here unemployment insurance a®ects equilibrium only through its
e®ect on Bt. In our benchmark analysis, we assume for simplicity that the unemployment
bene¯ts (and fees) in each period are determined so that this ratio remains constant:
Bt = ¹ B 2 (0;1]; for all t.
We later relax this assumption in Section 6 and let this ratio, Bt, °uctuate procyclically
over time.
In the benchmark case, there are two stochastic shocks: the government-purchase
shock, Gt, and the productivity shock, At. Assume that they take the form:
Gt = sG¹ Y e»G;t; and At = ¹ Ae»A;t;
where sG 2 (0;1), ¹ Y is the steady-state level of output, and f»G;t, »A;tg follows a stationary
stochastic process with unconditional mean of zero. Let »t denote the vector of these
exogenous disturbances:
»t = (»G;t;»A;t):
When Bt is allowed to °uctuate, we let Bt = ¹ Be»B;t, and »t = (»G;t;»A;t;»B;t).
103 E±cient allocation and °exible-price equilibrium
In this section we ¯rst rewrite the household's utility in terms of aggregate output and
a measure of output dispersion across ¯rms. A key ¯nding is that the less risk sharing
is, the less concave the household's utility is in aggregate output. Then we consider the
e±cient allocation given the exogenous shocks: Gt and At. Here, e±ciency is de¯ned to
be conditional on that the level of e®ort equals the equilibrium level, e, and that unem-
ployment insurance is limited by ¹ B. We shall also derive the °exible-price equilibrium. It
provides a useful benchmark, because, to a ¯rst-order approximation, the level of output
in the °exible-price equilibrium coincides with that in a sticky-price equilibrium with zero
in°ation.
3.1 Utility °ow of the household
Using (14)-(16), the °ow utility of the household (i.e., the average utility °ow of its mem-
bers) is given by




Nt + (1 ¡ Nt)Bt
Ct
¸
+ (1 ¡ Nt)ln
·
Bt






ln(H) ¡ ln(H ¡ he)
¤
Nt + ln(H);
= ln(Yt ¡ Gt) + z(Nt; ¹ B) ¡ !
£
ln(H) ¡ ln(H ¡ he)
¤
Nt + ln(H); (17)
where
z(N;B) ´ (1 ¡ N)lnB ¡ ln
£
N + (1 ¡ N)B
¤
:
The function z(N;B) represents the ine±ciency caused by imperfect risk sharing, B.
If B = 1, z(N;1) = 0 for all N, so that the °ow utility of the household takes the same
form as in the indivisible labor model of Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988):
Wt = ln(Yt ¡ Gt) ¡ !
£
ln(H) ¡ ln(H ¡ he)
¤
Nt + ln(H):
When B < 1, z(N;B) has a minimum at N = N(B), where
N(B) ´






and is increasing in N for N > N(B) and decreasing in N for N < N(B). In what follows,
we focus on the case where Nt > 1=2 holds almost surely for all t. Note also that the
11function z(N;B) is convex in N. Therefore, imperfect risk sharing makes the household's
objective function less concave.






































di ¸ 1: (19)
where the inequality follows from Jensen's inequality.
Using this, the °ow utility of the household can be expressed as a function of Yt, ¢t,
and exogenous disturbances:
W(Yt;¢t;»t) = U(Yt;Gt) + Z(Yt;¢;At; ¹ B) ¡ V (Yt;¢t;At) + ln(H); (20)
where






V (Y;¢;A) = !
£
ln(H) ¡ ln(H ¡ he)
¤
N(Y;¢;A) (23)
Since N(Y;¢;A) is convex in Y , so is Z(Y;¢;A;B). Hence imperfect unemployment
insurance, ¹ B < 1, makes the objective function of the household less concave relative to
the case of perfect insurance. That is, ceteris paribus, the household tends to be willing to
accept larger °uctuations in output when risk sharing is not perfect. This property plays
an important role in determining the character of optimal monetary policy in our model.
Throughout this paper we assume that Z(Y;¢;A;B) is not so convex that W(Y;¢;») is
strictly concave in Y and ¢ for each ».
Assumption 1. For each », W(Y;¢;») is strictly concave in Y and ¢.
3.2 E±cient rate of output
The e±cient allocation is the feasible allocation that maximizes the expected discounted
sum of the household's average utility °ows, fWtg, in (20). This Pareto problem has no
12predetermined variables and can be solved state by state in a static fashion. For each »t,
the e±cient allocation, fy¤




where Yt is given by (11). Under our assumption, it is straightforward to see that there is
no output dispersion in the e±cient allocation:
y¤
t(i) = Y ¤
t ; and ¢¤
t = 1;
and that the e±cient level of aggregate output satis¯es the ¯rst-order condition:
UY (Y ¤
t ;Gt) + ZY (Y ¤
t ;1;At; ¹ B) = VY (Y ¤
t ;1;At): (24)






Thus lower risk sharing (lower ¹ B) raises the e±cient level of output. This is because less
risk sharing makes unemployment more costly, and hence the e±cient level of unemploy-
ment is lower, which implies that the e±cient level of output is higher.
3.3 Flexible price equilibrium
Here we consider the °exible-price equilibrium, in which each ¯rm can change its product
price freely in every period. The °exible-price equilibrium de¯nes the \natural rates" of
endogenous variables, which are denoted by superscript n.







In the symmetric equilibrium, all ¯rms charge the same price, pt(i) = Pt, which yields
st(i) = 1 ¡ ©; 8i 2 [0;1]: (26)
In the °exible-price equilibrium, consumption of the employed can be written as
Cn
e;t = D(Y n











13Using (9), (21) and (23), condition (26) can be expressed as
Â(1 ¡ ©)UY (Y n
t ;Gt)D(Y n
t ;At; ¹ B)¡1 = VY (Y n
t ;1;At); (27)
where Â is the constant de¯ned by
Â ´
![ln(H) ¡ ln(H ¡ he)]
Âw
The natural rate of output, Y n
t , is de¯ned implicitly in (27).
As shown in the Appendix, in contrast with the case of the e±cient rate of output





This is because, other things being equal, an increase in risk sharing tends to reduce the
amount of consumption of the employed due to a rise in the unemployment-insurance fee.
As shown in equation (9), a decline in consumption of the employed, in turn, lowers the
wage rate and hence increases production.
4 Linear-quadratic approximation
We wish to characterize the optimal monetary policy using the linear-quadratic approach
developed by Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2003, 2005). In that approach,
the monetary authority maximizes a quadratic approximation of the utility of the repre-
sentative household subject to a log-linear approximation of the aggregate supply relation.
Each approximation is taken around the zero-in°ation steady state.





















where ¦t ´ Pt=Pt¡1 is the gross rate of in°ation in period t. Similarly, the evolution of


















14Using (30), we obtain










Consider the zero-in°ation steady state, that is, the equilibrium in which »t = 0 and
¦t = 1, for all t. In what follows, the value of each variable at the zero-in°ation steady
state is denoted by a bar. Equation (31) implies that ¢t = 1, for all t. The ¯rst-order
condition (13) reduces to st(i) = 1¡©, for all i, which implies that the level of output at
the zero-in°ation steady state, ¹ Y , is the solution to
Â(1 ¡ ©)UY (¹ Y ; ¹ G)D(¹ Y ; ¹ A; ¹ B)¡1 = VY (¹ Y ;1; ¹ A)
We assume that the zero-in°ation steady-state equilibrium is (conditionally) e±cient.
Assumption 2. The tax rate on monopoly revenue, ¿, is set so that the level of output
in the zero-in°ation steady state is e±cient:
¹ Y = ¹ Y ¤
Whether or not unemployment insurance is perfect, imperfect competition would cause
ine±ciency at the steady state. How such ine±ciency a®ects the optimal equilibrium
path has been analyzed, for instance, by Khan, King and Wolman (2003) and Benigno
and Woodford (2003, 2005). With Assumption 2, we can focus on the ine±ciency that
imperfect unemployment insurance introduces outside the steady state.
As shown in the Appendix, a log-linear approximation of ¯rst-order condition (13) for
p¤
t is given by
¼t = ·xt + ¯Et¼t+1 + ut: (32)
Here xt is the (welfare-relevant) output gap:
xt ´ ^ Yt ¡ ^ Y ¤
t ;
ut is the \cost-push shock," de¯ned by
ut ´ ·(^ Y ¤
t ¡ ^ Y n
t );
and · is the constant de¯ned by
· ´
(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ®¯)
®
¾¡1 ¡ ± + Á ¡ 1
1 + (Á ¡ 1)µ
;
15where ¾¡1 and ± are the elasticities of UY and D¡1 with respect to Y evaluated at the
zero-in°ation steady state:
¾¡1 ´ ¡









(1 ¡ ¹ B) ¹ N
¹ N + (1 ¡ ¹ N) ¹ B
¸ 0:
Note that ± = 0 with perfect insurance. It immediately follows that imperfect insurance
makes · smaller. In other words, the real e®ect of a nominal shock is larger with imperfect
insurance.
Proposition 1. Imperfect insurance makes the coe±cient · in the AS relation (32)
smaller:
·j ¹ B<1 < ·j ¹ B=1:




















1 + (Á ¡ 1)µ
¤
(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ®¯)
(1 ¡ ¡);
qy ´ ¾¡1(1 ¡ ¡) ¡ ³¡ + Á ¡ 1:
Here, ³ and ¡ are constants de¯ned by
³ ´
ZY Y ¹ Y
ZY




where all derivatives are evaluated at the zero-in°ation steady state. From (32) and (33), it
follows that the exogenous shocks relevant for the optimal policy problem are summarized
into a single composite variable, ut.
5 Optimal policy with constant risk sharing
In the traditional (Ramsey) approach, the optimal policy problem, say at date t0, is to
choose a state-contingent path, f¼t;xtgt¸t0, so as to maximize the household's utility
(33) subject to the aggregate-supply relation (32) for t ¸ t0. As is well known, this
type of optimization fails to be time consistent: if the planner is allowed to reoptimize
at a future date, it will choose a di®erent path of in°ation and output gap. Concerning
16this issue, Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2003, 2005) have shown that the
optimal policy problem can be modi¯ed into a recursive form with an additional constraint,
which is to allow the planner to make a commitment for one period. The solution to
such a constrained policy problem is called optimal policy from a timeless perspective.
Speci¯cally, in the linear-quadratic problem here, the modi¯ed policy problem at any date
t0 is to choose a state-contingent path, f¼t;xtgt¸t0, so as to maximize the household's
utility subject to the aggregate-supply relation as well as to the commitment from the
previous period of the form:
¼t0 = ¹ ¼t0:
Following Woodford (2003) and others, we shall consider the policy problem constrained
in this fashion. Note, however, that it yields the same impulse responses to exogenous dis-
turbances as the traditional, unconstrained policy problem (Woodford, 2003, Proposition
7.9).









Substituting into (32), we obtain the second-order di®erence equation in 't:
¯qyEt't+1 ¡
£
(1 + ¯)qy + ·2q¼
¤




(1 + ¯)qy + ·2q¼
¤
¹ + qy = 0;
has a solution pair, ¹ 2 (0;1) and 1=(¯¹) > 1. It follows that a bounded solution to (36)
takes the form of




where 't0¡1 satis¯es the initial condition: 't0¡1 ¡ 't0 = q¼¹ ¼t0. Given f'tg, the optimal
state-contingent evolution of ¼t and xt are derived using (34)-(35).
Equations (34), (35) and (37) tell us how the optimal state-contingent paths of ¼t
and xt depend on the composite shock, ut = ·(^ Y ¤
t ¡ ^ Y n
t ). For example, consider impulse
responses to a cost-push shock in period t. To be speci¯c, suppose that ut follows an
17AR(1) process given by ut = ½uut¡1 + ²u;t where ½u 2 (¡1;1) and ²u;t is i.i.d. with zero
mean. Equation (37) implies that
't+j = ¹'t+j¡1 + Áuut+j;
where Áu ´ ¡¹q¼=(1¡¯¹½u). It follows that impulse responses at dates t+j, j = 0;1;:::,
become






























Áu²u;t; for j = 0
1
q¼




Áu²u;t; for j ¸ 1
To see now how ut depends on the fundamental shocks, log-linearize the ¯rst-order
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¾¡1 ¡ ± + Á ¡ 1
> 0 (43)







s), for s = A;G.
9If inequality (44) below holds, c
¤
A > 0.
185.1 E®ects of imperfect insurance: Theoretical results
Optimal policy involves strict price-level stabilization (zero in°ation), if the °exible-price
equilibrium is optimal, so that ^ Y n
t = ^ Y ¤
t and ut = 0. It is obviously the case when the
unemployment insurance is perfect: ¹ B = 1. It is also the case when there are no govern-
ment purchases in the steady state, sG = 0. This is due to our homothetic preferences, as
is discussed in Benigno and Woodford (2005). The following proposition summarizes.




G. (b) If sG = 0, then c¤
A = cn
A.
In general, the °exible-price equilibrium is not e±cient outside the steady state, that
is, Y n
t 6= Y ¤
t , in spite of Assumption 2. Given the ¯rst-order conditions (24) and (27), the
elasticities of UY + ZY and UY D¡1 with respect to Y are important in determining the
nature of optimal monetary policy. At the zero-in°ation steady state, those elasticities
are given by
¡
UY Y Y + ZY Y Y
UY + ZY







= ¾¡1 ¡ ± · ¾¡1
With ¹ B = 1, they are both equal to ¾¡1 since ± = ¡ = 0. Thus, imperfect insurance makes
both UY +ZY and UY D¡1 less elastic with respect to Y . The former follows from the fact
that imperfect insurance makes the aggregate utility less concave. The latter follows from
the fact that an increase in Y raises Ce less than C, because it reduces unemployment (this
e®ect is re°ected in the term D¡1). As the next proposition states, this property implies
that the responses of Y ¤
t and Y n
t to an exogenous shift in Gt are larger with imperfect
insurance than with perfect insurance.
Proposition 3. Assume that sG > 0. The responses of Y ¤
t and Y n
t to Gt are larger with
imperfect insurance than with perfect insurance:
c¤
Gj ¹ B=1 < c¤
Gj ¹ B<1;
cn
Gj ¹ B=1 < cn
Gj ¹ B<1:
In other words, imperfect insurance makes the e±cient and natural rates of output
more volatile in response to a \demand shock." The opposite is true for the response to
a \supply shock," At.
19Proposition 4. Assume that sG > 0. The responses of Y ¤
t and Y n
t to At are smaller with
imperfect insurance than with perfect insurance:
c¤
Aj ¹ B<1 < c¤
Aj ¹ B=1;
cn
Aj ¹ B<1 < cn
Aj ¹ B=1:
With perfect insurance, the e±cient (and the natural) rate of output is determined
by the equation UY = VY , where the left-hand side expresses the marginal bene¯t of
increasing Y and the right-hand side its marginal cost. An increase in productivity, A,
lowers the marginal cost but does not a®ect the marginal bene¯t, and hence raises the
e±cient rate of output. With imperfect insurance, this e®ect is partially o®set because A
lowers ZY and D¡1.
Whether G and A are positive or negative cost-push shocks depends on the elasticities
of UY +ZY and UY D¡1. The following lemma provides a necessary and su±cient condition
that the former is greater than the latter.
Lemma 1.
¾¡1(1 ¡ ¡) ¡ ³¡ > ¾¡1 ¡ ± > 0 (44)
if and only if ¾¡1 ¡ ± > 0 and
(¾¡1 ¡ ±)
£
2± + ln( ¹ B)NÁ
¤
> (Á ¡ 1)
£
¡ln( ¹ B)NÁ ¡ ±
¤
Condition (44) holds if Á = 1 and ¹ B 2 (0:21;1). Indeed, it is satis¯ed for all the
numerical exercises we have considered, and hence, we shall restrict our attention to such
a case.
Proposition 5. Assume that sG > 0, ¹ B < 1 and (44) holds. Then the government-
purchase shock, G, is a negative cost-push shock and the productivity shock, A, is a positive
cost-push shock:
cu
G < 0; and cu
A > 0:
The following proposition shows how imperfect insurance a®ects the persistence pa-
rameter ¹ of optimal policy.
Proposition 6. Under condition (44), imperfect insurance makes the persistence param-
eter ¹ in (37) larger:
¹j ¹ B=1 < ¹j ¹ B<1:
205.2 E®ects of imperfect insurance: Quantitative results
We have seen that the exact zero-in°ation policy is not optimal if the unemployment
insurance is not perfect. Here we examine quantitatively how much optimal policy di®ers
from the complete price-level stabilization. Assume that the exogenous disturbances, »A;t
and »G;t, follow the AR(1) process given by »A;t = ½A»A;t¡1+²A;t and »G;t = ½G»G;t¡1+²G;t,
where ²A;t and ²G;t are i.i.d. random variables with mean zero. In the numerical exercise
below, we set ® = 0:66, ¯ = 0:99 (the time unit is a quarter), Á = 1:47, and µ = 10, which
are in accordance with the parameter values assumed in Woodford (2003, Table 5.1). In
addition we assume sG = 0:2 and ¹ N = 0:94. Di®erent values are examined for ¹ B, ½A and
½G.
Figures 1-4 plot optimal responses of ¼t, xt ´ ^ Yt ¡ ^ Y ¤
t , and ^ Yt to the productivity and
government-purchase shocks, for di®erent values of ¹ B, ½A, and ½G.10 We set the size of
the initial innovation to the two shocks as ²A;0 = ¡2:34% and ²G;0 = ¡13:76%, both of
which reduce the e±cient level of output by 2 percent, ^ Y ¤
0 = ¡2%, in the case of ¹ B = 1
and ½A = ½G = 0. The in°ation rate is expressed as an annual rate in percentage points
and the output gap and the level of output are expressed in percentage deviations from
their steady-state values.
***Figures 1-2 are located here.***
In Figures 1-2, shocks are serially uncorrelated, ½A = ½G = 0, and di®erent degrees
of risk sharing are considered: ¹ B = 0:5;0:75;1:0. Consistent with the theoretical results
above, the exact price stabilization is optimal in the case of perfect insurance ( ¹ B = 1),
and the less risk sharing is (the lower ¹ B is), the more the optimal policy di®ers from the
complete price-level stabilization. Consistent with Propositions 3-4, less insurance makes
optimal responses of output to the government-purchase shock (the productivity shock)
larger (smaller). However, quantitatively, the optimal policy may not be distinguishable
from the complete price-level stabilization. Figures 1-2 show that even when ¹ B is as low
as 0.5, the optimal policy generates almost no in°ation or de°ation and lets output decline
by about 2 percent.
***Figures 3-4 are located here.***
10Speci¯cally, those ¯gures plot E0¼t ¡ E¡1¼t etc. for t = 0;1;:::;8.
21We have seen that, quantitatively, the steady-state level of risk sharing, ¹ B, does not
matter much. In what follows we set our benchmark value of ¹ B to 0.75. We have chosen
this value following Alexopoulos (2004), who set ¹ B = 0:78 based on the evidence in
Gruber (1997).11 We next examine the e®ects of the persistence of each shock. In Figures
3-4, we plot the optimal policy responses when both ½A and ½G are 0.9, respectively
( ¹ B = 0:75). As the persistence of a shock becomes greater, the optimal responses to
it involve larger °uctuations in the in°ation rate and the output gap. However, these
¯gures again show that regardless of the values of ½A and ½G, deviations of the optimal
policy from the complete price-level stabilization is quantitatively very small. We thus
conclude that, as far as the degree of risk sharing is constant, imperfect risk sharing does
not have a quantitatively signi¯cant impact on the optimal policy, and the optimal policy
is essentially characterized by the price-level stabilization.
6 Optimal policy with countercyclical idiosyncratic shocks
We have so far focused on the case where the degree of risk sharing is constant, Bt = ¹ B. In
our model, Bt is the relative income level of the unemployed to the employed, and hence,
it measures the earnings loss that workers experience when they become unemployed. Ac-
cording to the evidence such as Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993), such earnings loss
°uctuates countercyclically, i.e., Bt °uctuates procyclically.12 In this section we shall see
that the optimal policy would involve much larger °uctuations in in°ation if Bt °uctuates
procyclically.
6.1 Optimal responses to a negative insurance shock












11Although ¹ B does not matter much in our model, it may well play an important role in other contexts.
For instance, the results by Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (forthcoming) show that the
value of non-market activity, which might correspond to ¹ B in our model, signi¯cantly a®ects the cyclical
properties of the labor search model. Hagedorn and Manovskii show that the standard search model does
much better if we set ¹ B = 0:95, as opposed to the value chosen by Shimer (2005), which is ¹ B = 0:4.










¾¡1(1 ¡ ¡) ¡ ³¡ + Á ¡ 1
Á(1 ¡ ¹ B) ¹ N[(1 ¡ ¹ N)2 ¹ B ¡ ¹ N2]




¾¡1 ¡ ± + Á ¡ 1
(1 ¡ ¹ N) ¹ B
¹ N + (1 ¡ ¹ N) ¹ B
It follows from equations (25) and (28) that cn
B > 0 and c¤
B < 0. Hence Bt is a negative
cost-push shock.
Proposition 7. The insurance shock, Bt, is a negative cost-push shock:
cu
B < 0:
***Figure 5 is located here.***
The intuition of this result is simple. A higher Bt reduces the e±cient level of output,
Y ¤
t , because it reduces the inequality between the employed and the unemployed, and
hence raises the e±cient rate of unemployment. On the other hand, an increase in Bt
raises the natural rate of output, Y n
t , because it reduces the consumption of the employed,
Ce
t, and hence reduces the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption
of the employed (and the wage rate), which raises the level of output in the °exible-price
equilibrium. Figure 5 plots the optimal responses to a negative insurance shock at date 0:
B0 = 0:65 and Bt = 0:75 for t 6= 0. It shows that in response to such a shock, the optimal
polity raises both in°ation and output signi¯cantly.
6.2 Optimal responses with cyclical Bt
Now let us examine quantitatively how cyclical °uctuations in Bt a®ects the optimal policy.
Speci¯cally, we shall consider the impulse responses of the optimal policy to a decline in
At or Gt, assuming that such negative shocks to the economy accompany a decrease in Bt
(an increase in the earnings loss of the unemployed).
We consider the same size of the initial innovations for the productivity and government-
purchase shock as in the previous ¯gures: ²A;0 = ¡2:34% and ²G;0 = ¡13:76%. Also, the
steady-state level of risk sharing is given by ¹ B = 0:75 and shocks are serially uncorre-
lated: ½A = ½G = 0. Here, however, we assume that those negative shocks arrive with a
temporary decline in the degree of risk sharing: B0 = 0:65. It returns to the steady-state
23level after one period: Bt = ¹ B for t ¸ 1. Note that such a decline in Bt (from ¹ B = 0:75
to B0 = 0:65) seems to be empirically plausible. For instance, based on various empirical
work, Krebs (2007) assumes that the di®erence in the earnings losses of displaced workers
between booms and recessions is 12 percent in his numerical analysis.
***Figures 6-7 are located here.***
In Figures 6-7, the solid lines describe the impulse response functions of the optimal
policy for those composite shocks. For comparison, the dotted lines show the case with
constant Bt. As we have already seen, with constant risk sharing, the optimal policy is
essentially characterized as the complete price-level stabilization. For instance, Bt ´ 0:75
and ²A;0 = ¡2:34% leads to ¼0 = ¡0:0063 percent. As we know from Figure 1, even with
Bt ´ 0:5, ¼0 = ¡0:011 percent. However, if B0 moves together with ²A;0, then optimal
policy involves much larger responses of the in°ation rate: when B0 = 0:65 = ¹ B ¡ 0:1,
¼0 = 0:25%. Similarly, such countercyclical income losses of the unemployed imply much
larger responses of the output gap, x0 = ^ Y0¡^ Y ¤
0 (x0 = 0:013%;¡0:53% for B0 = ¹ B; ¹ B¡0:1,
respectively). It is also noteworthy that a countercyclical idiosyncratic income shock
calls for more stabilization of the actual level of output, ^ Yt: ^ Y0 = ¡1:966%;¡0:29%
for B0 = ¹ B; ¹ B ¡ 0:1, respectively. Figure 7 illustrates that optimal responses to the
government-purchase shock share similar properties.
We ¯nd it interesting that the actual level of output, ^ Yt, is stabilized quite strongly
under optimal policy when the degree of risk sharing, Bt, °uctuates cyclically. In the case
where B0 declines to 0.65, the optimal responses of ¼0 and ^ Y0 are of similar magnitude.
There are two reasons for this. First, although negative shocks ²A;0 and ²G;0 tend to reduce
the e±cient level of output, Y ¤
0 , the deterioration in risk sharing calls for stimulation of
the economy and hence tends to raise the e±cient level of output. These two forces o®set
each other so that ^ Y ¤
0 is close to zero and the equilibrium level of output is stabilized
under optimal policy. Second, °uctuations in the in°ation rate and the output gap are
larger with cyclical Bt because its quantitative impact on the cost-push shock, ut, is large,
which, in turn, is the result of the fact that a shock to risk sharing a®ects the e±cient and
natural levels of output in the opposite directions (recall that cn
B > 0 and c¤
B < 0).
6.3 Extension to the case with distorted steady state
So far we have maintained the assumption that the non-stochastic steady state is e±cient
(Assumption 2). Here, we relax this assumption and see that our basic result extends to
24the case with distorted steady state. For this purpose, we choose to follow the approach
taken by Khan, King and Wolman (2003), that is, linearizing the ¯rst-order conditions
for the optimal policy problem (the \Ramsey" problem), rather than the linear-quadratic
approach of Benigno and Woodford (2005), which we have taken so far.
From (17), the °ow utility of the household can be written as
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Ce;t (46)








































where ¸t is the Lagrange multiplier on the °ow budget constraint in the household's
utility-maximization problem. Here, equation (45) is the ¯rst-order condition with re-
spect to Ce;t in the household's utility-maximization problem; (46) is the goods market
clearing condition; (47)-(49) describe the pro¯t-maximization condition under the Calvo
pricing; (50) is the aggregate production technology; and (51) de¯nes the relative-price
distortion ¢t. Note that the policy-maker here takes as given the sticky-price distortion,
the e±ciency-wage distortion, the imperfectness of the unemployment insurance, and the
monopoly distortion. In this sense, this is the second-best problem.
***Figure 8 is located here.***
25We have used Dynare to solve this problem numerically.13 We conduct the same
exercise as in Figure 6 except that the steady state is no longer e±cient. Speci¯cally, we
set the parameter values so that the natural rate of output is 90 percent of the e±cient
rate of output in the steady state. The solid lines in Figure 8 plot the optimal response
of in°ation and output to a temporary decline in the productivity that accompanies a
decline in the degree of risk sharing Bt (B0 = 0:65 and Bt = 0:75 for t 6= 0 as in Figure
6). For comparison, the dashed lines depict the case where Bt is constant. We can see
that our basic results continue to hold when the steady state is distorted: the in°ation
rate responds much more and output is stabilized to a larger extent when the degree of
risk sharing °uctuates cyclically.
6.4 Second moment properties
In order to further examine the e®ect of cyclical °uctuations in Bt on the optimal policy,
let us investigate the second-moment properties of the model. For comparison, we consider
a Taylor-rule policy as well as the Ramsey (or optimal) policy. The Taylor rule we consider
is given by
ln(Rt) = ln( ¹ R) + ®¼ ln(¼t)
where Rt is the nominal interest rate. We set ¹ R so that the in°ation rate is zero at the
steady state. For ®¼, we follow Dittmar, Gavin and Kydland (2005) and set ®pi = 1:5.
Concerning the exogenous shocks, we abstract from the government-purchase shock:
»G;t = 0 for all t. We assume that the productivity process follows:
lnAt = ½A lnAt¡1 + »A;t
where ½A = 0:95 and »A;t is i.i.d. and follows N(0;¾2
A). For normalization, we choose ¾A
so that the standard deviation of output in the model economy with the Taylor-rule policy
coincides with that in the U.S. data. For the risk-sharing process, Bt, we consider two
cases. The ¯rst case is the one where Bt is constant, Bt = 0:75 for all t. The second case
is the one where Bt °uctuates cyclically. Speci¯cally, we consider the following process for
Bt:
lnBt = (1 ¡ ½B)ln ¹ B + ½B lnBt¡1 + ¾B»A;t
13Dynare is a suite of programs for estimation and simulation of DSGE models, which was originally
developed by Michel Juillard. It is available at http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare/.
26where ¾B is set so that a one-percent decline in A reduces Bt from ¹ B = 0:75 to 0:7, that
is, ¾B = (ln(0:75) ¡ ln(0:7)) ¤ 100 = 6:9. This is roughly consistent with the exercises we
have done in Figures 6-8, and seems to be in line with the value obtained in the literature.
***Table 1 is located here.***
Table 1 shows the standard deviation of log output (std(^ Y ), the standard deviation
of the in°ation rate (std(¼)), the correlation coe±cient of those two variables, and the
autocorrelation coe±cients of each variable for the U.S. data and for several versions of
our model. We can see that our basic result holds here: First, regardless of whether the
steady state is e±cient or not, if Bt is constant over time, the optimal policy stabilizes
the price level almost completely (the standard deviation of the in°ation rate is 0.01
percent for both cases). Note that the standard deviation of output under the optimal
policy is greater than that under the Taylor-rule policy. Second, if Bt °uctuates cyclically,
the optimal policy allows in°ation to vary signi¯cantly, and at the same time, reduces
the variation in the level of output. In terms of the standard deviations of output and
in°ation, the Ramsey policy with cyclical Bt seems to generate statistics closer to the
data than the Ramsey policy with constant Bt. This is also the case with correlation:
The correlation between output and in°ation under optimal policy is fairly high (about
0.65) when Bt is constant, but it is close to zero when Bt is cyclical, which is consistent
with the data. The autocorrelation of output is higher in the optimal policy with cyclical
Bt, which is, again, consistent with the data. Overall, we can see that the optimal policy
with cyclical Bt generates statistics much closer to the U.S. data than the optimal policy
with constant Bt, both in terms of standard deviations and the correlation coe±cients of
output and in°ation. Of course, our model is too stylized to compare directly to the data,
but nevertheless, we ¯nd this result interesting.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have considered an e±ciency-wage model with the Calvo-type sticky
prices, and analyzed the optimal monetary policy when the unemployment insurance is
not perfect. In the standard sticky-price model, the strict zero-in°ation policy becomes
optimal if the zero-in°ation steady state is e±cient. This is because the relative-price
distortion is the only distortion in such a case, and such distortion can be eliminated by
the strict zero-in°ation policy. We have seen, however, that with imperfect unemployment
27insurance, the strict zero-in°ation policy is no longer optimal, even if the zero-in°ation
steady-state equilibrium is e±cient. Quantitatively, though, if the level of risk sharing is
constant over business cycles, the di®erence between the optimal policy and the strict zero-
in°ation policy is minimal. We have also shown, however, that if the level of risk sharing
is procyclical, that is, if idiosyncratic shocks are countercyclical, as evidence suggests, the
di®erence becomes substantial. Indeed, in such a case output must be stabilized much
more compared to the case with perfect insurance.
One important limitation of our model is that, in order to keep the representative-
household framework, idiosyncratic shocks are assumed to be purely temporary. Evidence
suggests that idiosyncratic shocks are highly persistent as well as countercyclical.14 Krebs
(2007) argues that the persistence as well as the countercyclicality of idiosyncratic shocks
matter a lot concerning the welfare cost of business cycles. Incorporating persistent id-
iosyncratic shocks is left for future research.
In addition, our labor market is very stylized and so another direction of future research
is to extend our model in that respect. For instance, we have assumed that a shirker would
be punished by an exogenously given amount of wage reduction. It might be worthwhile to
consider a more general contract problem with a ¯rm and a worker. Alternatively, it may
be interesting to consider other speci¯cations to generate unemployment, such as search.
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Appendix
Cost-minimization problem of a ¯rm





The ¯rst equation implies that Cs=Ce = ~ s 2 [s;1], where ~ s is de¯ned as the solution to
d(Â ¡ s)(1 ¡ ~ s) = !(1 ¡ s)~ s(~ s¡ d
! ¡ 1):
















Ce;t; where Â ´
1 ¡ ~ s
1 ¡ s
:
Equivalence with a version of Shapiro and Stiglitz's (1984) model
Consider the following version of Shapiro and Stiglitz's (1984) model: if a shirker gets
caught she is immediately ¯red and receives no wages; there are two levels of e®ort et 2
f0; ¹ eg. The rest is the same as our model in the text. Then the incentive compatibility
constraint becomes
U(Ce;t; ¹ e) ¸ (1 ¡ d)U(Ce;t;0) + dU(Cu;t;0);
30where Ce;t and Cu;t are as given in (4) and (6), respectively. This model and our model
become essentially identical if (i) ¹ e is at the level given by (52) and (ii) the unemployment
insurance program is given by
UI
f
t = (1 ¡ Nt)shWt; and UIb
t = NtshWt:
This is because this insurance program implies Cs;t = Cu;t in our original model.
Derivation of (25) and (28)





UY Y + ZY Y ¡ VY Y
The denominator is negative, UY Y + ZY Y ¡ VY Y < 0, because of Assumption 1. The
numerator is also negative:





N + (1 ¡ N)B
+
(1 ¡ B)(1 ¡ N)NY
[N + (1 ¡ N)B]2
=
(1 ¡ B)NY
B[N + (1 ¡ N)B]
B(1 ¡ N)2 ¡ N2
N + (1 ¡ N)B
· 0;
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that N > 1=2.
For (28), dlnY n
t =dln ¹ B is easier to compute:
@ lnY n
@ ln ¹ B
=
1
¾¡1 ¡ ± + Á ¡ 1
(1 ¡ N) ¹ B
N + (1 ¡ N) ¹ B
¸ 0:
Here, note that ¾¡1 ¸ 1 and Á ¸ ±.
Derivation of the aggregate-supply relation (32)
A log-linear approximation of the ¯rst-order condition for p¤
















The real marginal cost of ¯rm i is written as
^ st(i) = (Á ¡ 1)^ yt(i) + (¾¡1 ¡ ±)^ Yt ¡ (¾¡1 ¡ ± + Á ¡ 1)^ Y n
t
Taking the average over i 2 [0;1], the average real marginal cost in period t is
^ st = (¾¡1 ¡ ± + Á ¡ 1)(^ Yt ¡ ^ Y n
t )
31Log-linearizing the demand function (10) yields





^ st;T = ^ sT + (Á ¡ 1)
¡
^ yt;T ¡ ^ YT
¢
= ^ sT ¡ (Á ¡ 1)µ^ p¤











1 + (Á ¡ 1)µ]^ p¤
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Solving for ^ p¤




1 + (Á ¡ 1)µ
^ st + ®¯Et¼t+1 + ®¯Et^ p¤
t+1 (54)











1 + (Á ¡ 1)µ





1 + (Á ¡ 1)µ
(¾¡1 ¡ ± + Á ¡ 1)(^ Yt ¡ ^ Y n
t ) + ¯Et¼t+1
which is equation (32) in the main text.
Derivation of the welfare approximation (33)
Remember that the household's °ow utility is given by
W(Yt;¢t;»t) = U(Yt;Gt) + Z(Yt;¢;At;Bt) ¡ V (Yt;¢t;At) + ln(H);
where U, Z, and V are as de¯ned in (21)-(23). We follow Woodford (2003), and Benigno
and Woodford (2003, 2005) to obtain a quadratic approximation of the household welfare.
We denote by ¥ the vector of expansion parameters: ¥ = (^ Y ;»;¢
1=2
¡1 ). First, U(Yt;Gt)
is approximated as
U(Yt;Gt) = ¹ U + UY ~ Yt ¡ UY ~ Gt +
1
2
UY Y ~ Y 2
t ¡ UY Y ~ Yt ~ Gt +
1
2
UY Y ~ G2
t + O(k¥k
3)










UY Y ¹ Y 2^ Y 2
t ¡ UY Y ¹ Y ¹ G»G;t^ Yt + t.i.p. + O(k¥k
3)




UY ¹ Y + UY Y ¹ Y 2¢^ Y 2
t ¡ UY Y ¹ Y 2gt^ Yt + t.i.p. + O(k¥k
3)
32where gt measures the change in Yt required to keep UY constant:
gt ´ ¡
UY G ¹ G
UY Y ¹ Y
= sG»G;t
Next, note that the evolution of ¢t, (31), implies that














¯t ^ ¢t =
®µÁ
£
1 + (Á ¡ 1)µ
¤






+ t.i.p. + O(k¥k
3) (55)








ZY ¹ Y + ZY Y ¹ Y 2¢^ Y 2









VY ¹ Y + VY Y ¹ Y 2¢^ Y 2
t ¡ VY Y ¹ Y 2qt^ Yt + t.i.p. + O(k¥k
3)
where kt and qt are the change in Yt required to keep ZY and VY constant, respectively:
kt ´
ZY A ¹ A
ZY Y ¹ Y
»A;t ¡
ZY B ¹ B
ZY Y ¹ Y
»B;t
qt ´ ¡
VY A ¹ A
VY Y ¹ Y
»A;t
Since the zero-in°ation steady-state is conditionally e±cient,





UY Y + ZY Y ¡ VY Y
¡









¹ Y 2(UY Y + ZY Y ¡ VY Y )(^ Yt ¡ ^ Y ¤
t )2 + t.i.p. + O(k¥k
3)








¾¡1(1 ¡ ¡) ¡ ³¡ + Á ¡ 1




+ t.i.p. + O(k¥k
3)
where ¡ is de¯ned by
¡ ´
ZY ¹ Y
UY ¹ Y + ZY ¹ Y












®µ[1 + (Á ¡ 1)µ]




¾¡1(1 ¡ ¡) ¡ ³¡ + Á ¡ 1




+ t.i.p. + O(k¥k
3)
which is (33) in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 3





¾¡1(1 ¡ ¡) ¡ ³¡ + Á ¡ 1
¡
¾¡1sG
¾¡1 + Á ¡ 1
=
¾¡1sG¡(³ + 1 ¡ Á)
[¾¡1(1 ¡ ¡) ¡ ³¡ + Á ¡ 1][¾¡1 + Á ¡ 1]
> 0
because









¾¡1 ¡ ± + Á ¡ 1
¡
¾¡1sG
¾¡1 + Á ¡ 1
> 0
because ± > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4




Á ¡ ¡(³ + 1)
¾¡1(1 ¡ ¡) ¡ ³¡ + Á ¡ 1
¡
Á
¾¡1 + Á ¡ 1
= ¡
(¾¡1 ¡ 1)(³ + 1)¡
[¾¡1(1 ¡ ¡) ¡ ³¡ + Á ¡ 1][¾¡1 + Á ¡ 1]
< 0





¾¡1 ¡ ± + Á ¡ 1
¡
Á
¾¡1 + Á ¡ 1
= ¡
(¾¡1 ¡ 1)±
[¾¡1 ¡ ± + Á ¡ 1][¾¡1 + Á ¡ 1]
< 0;
again, because ¾¡1 > 1.
34Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 follows from
¾¡1(1 ¡ ¡) + ³¡ ¡ (¾¡1 ¡ ±) = ± ¡ ¡(¾¡1 + ³)
= ± ¡
ZY Y



















Proof of Proposition 5
That cu







¾¡1(1 ¡ ¡) ¡ ³¡ + Á ¡ 1
¡
¾¡1sG
¾¡1 ¡ ± + Á ¡ 1
< 0
because ¡ > 0 and ¾¡1(1¡¡)¡³¡ > ¾¡1¡± under condition (44). The second inequality,
cu






Á ¡ ¡³ ¡ ¡
¾¡1(1 ¡ ¡) ¡ ³¡ + Á ¡ 1
¡
Á ¡ ±




(1 ¡ ¡)± + ¡(Á ¡ 1 ¡ ³)
¤
£
¾¡1(1 ¡ ¡) ¡ ³¡ + Á ¡ 1
¤£
¾¡1 ¡ ± + Á ¡ 1
¤
Remember that
³ = Á ¡ 1 +
±2
ZY Y
; and ¡ =
ZY Y
ZY Y + ¾¡1:
Thus







(¾¡1 ¡ 1)(¾¡1 ¡ ±)±
£
¾¡1(1 ¡ ¡) ¡ ³¡ + Á ¡ 1
¤£




because ¾¡1 > 1 because sG > 0 and ¾¡1 > ± because of (44).
35Proof of Proposition 6
De¯ne the quadratic function f(¹) by
f(m) ´ ¯m2 ¡
µ









1 + µ(Á ¡ 1)
(¾¡1 ¡ ± + Á ¡ 1)
q¼ =
®µ[1 + µ(Á ¡ 1)]
(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ®¯)
(1 ¡ ¡)





(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ®¯)
®[1 + µ(Á ¡ 1)]
(1 ¡ ¡)(¾¡1 ¡ ± + Á ¡ 1)2
¾¡1(1 ¡ ¡) ¡ ³¡ + Á ¡ 1
For ¹j ¹ B<1 > ¹j ¹ B=1, it su±ces to show that
(1 ¡ ¡)(¾¡1 ¡ ± + Á ¡ 1)2
¾¡1(1 ¡ ¡) ¡ ³¡ + Á ¡ 1
< ¾¡1 + Á ¡ 1
Under our assumption,
¾¡1 ¡ ± + Á ¡ 1 < ¾¡1(1 ¡ ¡) ¡ ³¡ + Á ¡ 1
It then follows that
(1 ¡ ¡)(¾¡1 ¡ ± + Á ¡ 1)2
¾¡1(1 ¡ ¡) ¡ ³¡ + Á ¡ 1
< ¾¡1 ¡ ± + Á ¡ 1
< ¾¡1 + Á ¡ 1
36Table 1: Second-moment properties
(a) The case of e±cient steady state
Constant Bt Cyclical Bt
Data Taylor Ramsey Taylor Ramsey
std(^ Yt) 1.50 1.50 1.74 1.50 1.27
std(¼t) 1.11 0.66 0.01 0.81 0.35
corr(^ Yt;¼t) 0.15 -1.00 0.65 -1.00 -0.10
AR1(^ Yt) 0.86 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.91
AR1(¼t) 0.49 0.71 0.42 0.71 0.42
(b) The case of ine±cient steady state
Constant Bt Cyclical Bt
Data Taylor Ramsey Taylor Ramsey
std(^ Yt) 1.50 1.50 1.76 1.50 1.38
std(¼t) 1.11 0.67 0.01 0.95 0.32
corr(^ Yt;¼t) 0.15 -1.00 0.64 -1.00 -0.18
AR1(^ Yt) 0.86 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.90
AR1(¼t) 0.49 0.71 0.40 0.71 0.40
Notes: All series are HP ¯ltered. The in°ation rates are annual rates. The sample period
of the data is 1960.I-2007.IV. `Taylor' denotes the equilibrium under the Taylor rule,
and `Ramsey' denotes the equilibrium under the Ramsey policy. std(x) is the standard
deviation of variable x; corr(x;y) is the correlation coe±cient between variables x and y;
and AR1(x) is the autocorrelation coe±cient of variable x.



















Figure 1: Optimal responses to a negative productivity shock for di®erent degrees of risk sharing.
In each panel, the solid, dashed, and dash-dotted lines correspond to ¹ B = 0:5;0:75;1:0, respectively.
Note: The in°ation rate is expressed at an annual rate in percentage points. The output gap and
the level of output are expressed as percentage deviations from their respective steady-state values.


















Figure 2: Optimal responses to a negative government-purchase shock for di®erent degrees of risk
sharing. In each panel, the solid, dashed, and dash-dotted lines correspond to ¹ B = 0:5;0:75;1:0,
respectively. See the note in Figure 1 for the units.

















Figure 3: Optimal responses to a negative productivity shock with ½A = 0:9 (solid line)
and ½A = 0 (dashed line). See the note in Figure 1 for the units.


















Figure 4: Optimal responses to a negative government-purchase shock with ½G = 0:9 (solid
line) and ½G = 0 (dashed line). See the note in Figure 1 for the units.
















Figure 5: Optimal responses to a negative insurance shock. See the note in Figure 1 for
the units.


















Figure 6: Optimal responses to a negative productivity shock with cyclical Bt (solid line)
and constant Bt (dashed line). See the note in Figure 1 for the units.





















Figure 7: Optimal responses to a negative government-purchase shock with cyclical Bt
(solid line) and constant constant Bt (dashed line). See the note in Figure 1 for the units.












Figure 8: Optimal responses to a negative productivity shock with cyclicalBt (solid line)
and constant Bt (dashed line) when the steady state is distorted. See the note in Figure
1 for the units.
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